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Abstract The creation of paraconsistent logics have expanded the boundaries
of formal logic by introducing coherent systems that tolerate contradictions
without triviality. Thanks to their novel approach and rigorous formaliza-
tion they have already found many applications in computer science, linguis-
tics and mathematics. As a natural next step, some philosophers have also
tried to answer the question if human everyday reasoning could be accurately
modelled with paraconsistent logics. The purpose of this article is to argue
against the notion that human reasoning is paraconsistent. Numerous findings
in the area of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience go against the
hypothesis that humans tolerate contradictions in their inferences. Humans
experience severe stress and confusion when confronted with contradictions
(i.e., the so-called cognitive dissonance). Experiments on the ways in which
humans process contradictions point out that the first thing humans do is
remove or modify one of the contradictory statements. From an evolutionary
perspective, contradiction is useless and even more dangerous than lack of in-
formation because it takes up resources to process. Furthermore, it appears
that when logicians, anthropologists or psychologists provide examples of con-
tradictions in human culture and behaviour, their examples very rarely take
the form of: (p ∧ ¬p). Instead, they are often conditional statements, proba-
bilistic judgments, metaphors or seemingly incompatible beliefs. At different
points in time humans are definitely able to hold contradictory beliefs, but
within one reasoning leading to a particular behaviour, contradiction is never
tolerated.
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1 Introduction
“’From a contradiction everything would follow.’ The reply to that is: Well
then, don’t draw any conclusions from a contradiction.”
-Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1939.
Contradiction is one of the most central concepts to logic and philosophy. Most
paradoxes cherished by philosophers have a contradiction at their heart, while
proof by contradiction is one of the classic methods for proving theorems in
logic. In classical logic the principle of explosion states that from a set that
contains contradictory premises, everything follows. As a result, in classical
logic nothing meaningful can ever be derived from a contradiction. At the
same time, contradictory ideas seem to be widely present across all human
cultures since the dawn of time (Berliner et al. 2016).
Because contradictions are so widely present in the culture and because
people seem to be able to deal with them so well in their everyday life, logicians
decided to reflect on the principle of explosion and applicability of classical
logic to human everyday thinking. The explosion principle states that every
statement can be inferred from a contradiction, but the psychology of human
behaviour did not present any data whatsoever that would show that humans
somehow satisfy it in their cognition. After all, at first glance it may seem that
humans are able to relatively effortlessly hold contradictory beliefs without a
cognitive overload. As a result, a deceptively alluring idea was born – that
humans reason from contradictory premises in their everyday thinking. A need
arose for the principle of explosion to be suspended when considering human
reasoning processes. That gave rise the attempts at applying paraconsistent
logics to human thinking.
The aim of this article is to critically analyse the claim that humans tolerate
inconsistencies or contradictions in their thinking. I will argue that humans do
not reason from contradictory premises. Instead, they resolve contradictions
with a variety of strategies that allow them to partition contradictory beliefs
into separate, consistent sets of premises. Furthermore, I will point out that
numerous so-called contradictions analysed in the literature are not contra-
dictions in the strict sense of the word. Instead, they tend to be conditional
statements, probabilistic judgments, metaphors or merely seemingly incom-
patible beliefs, while at their core never assuming the form of: It is the case
that p and it is the case that ¬p. We will analyse psychological and logical
works that used the idea of humans reasoning from contradictions as a central
point for their considerations. It is important to highlight that the aim of this
paper is not to argue against dialetheism or the usefulness of paraconsistent
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logics. It is merely to refute the claim that contradictions are often starting
points for everyday human inferences.
2 Logical aspects
Etymologically speaking, the word “contradiction” comes from the Latin “con-
tradicere,” where the prefix “contra” means “opposite” and the verb “dicere”
means “to say.” As a result, the word expresses a notion of: “saying the op-
posite.” In the simplest terms, in classical logic a set of propositions X is
contradictory if and only if for any proposition p,X ` p, which means that the
set X satisfies the relation: X ` p for all p. In other words, any proposition
can be derived from a contradiction, which is called the principle of explosion
or ex falso quodlibet.
In more human terms, a contradiction is a pair of propositions that cannot
both be true at the same time and cannot both be false at the same time. That
formulation can also be called the law of non-contradiction: ¬(p ∧ ¬p). The
other two “laws of thought” that delineate the boundaries of contradictions
are the law of identity and the law of excluded middle. The law of identity
states that “Everything is what it is” (i.e., a = a)1, while the law of excluded
middle states that in a pair of propositions p,¬p, either one of them has to be
true.
Ontologically, contradictions are linguistic/logical representations of im-
possibilities: facts that cannot co-occur. Conveniently, contradictions can also
be defined in terms of models or possible worlds (Novaes 2007): for a con-
tradictory A and B, there is no such model or possible world M such that
M |= A and M |= B and there is no such model or possible world M ′ such
that M ′ |= ¬A and M ′ |= ¬B.
The existence of contradictions has always been of critical importance for
mathematics, logic and philosophy. One of the most popular proof types in
these disciplines is the “proof by contradiction.” It is a straightforward proce-
dure, where we assume the tested proposition p to be false. Then, if ¬p ` q∧¬q,
then because q and ¬q cannot both be true, we conclude that: ¬(¬p).2 The
importance of contradictions is also evident when considering that paradoxes
are propositions which lead to circular, contradictory conclusions ( Lukowski
2011).
The law of non-contradiction has had many formulations across history.
The most influential work on these formulations was published by Ignacy
 Lukasiewicz in 1910. In his publication entitled “On the principle of contra-
diction in Aristotle”3 he reinterpreted the ways in which Aristotle described
the law of non-contradiction.  Lukasiewicz found that the Stagirite spelled out
1 a in the law of identity is understood as a single term rather than a proposition.
2 This type of proof is called ”non-constructive”, in opposition to ”constructive” proof,
which is stronger.
3 Originally published in Polish under the title: ”O zasadzie sprzecznos´ci u Arystotelesa.
Studium krytyczne.”
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three substantially different formulations. The first one, called “ontological”
addressed physical reality: “To no object can the same characteristic belong
and not belong at the same time.” The second one, called “logical” concerned
propositions: “Two conflicting (contradictory) propositions cannot be true at
the same time.” Finally, and most interestingly for this work, Aristotle pro-
vided us with a third formulation that referred to the human mind, which
 Lukasiewicz dubbed as “psychological.” A direct translation of the relevant
part of Metaphysics yields:
“No one can believe that the same thing is and is not (as some would claim
Heraclitus said), because the speaker does not have to believe what he says.”
(Aristotle, trans. 1910)
 Lukasiewicz (1910, p. 11-13) reformulated it as follows: “Two acts of be-
lieving which correspond to two contradictory propositions cannot obtain in
the same consciousness.”4 This view of the law of non-contradiction has been
heavily criticised for “psychologising” Aristotle’s thought and logicians sought
to find translations that would rid this formulation from the aspects that per-
tain to mind, subjectivity and interlocution (Pietryga 2004; Stuchlin´ski 1994).
For example, in such attempts, Stuchlin´ski (1994) produced an alternative for-
mulation that states: “A person X in time t does not acknowledge the sentence:
S and not-S as true in language L.” (Stuchlin´ski 1994, p. 49). Despite the fact
that these authors denounced psychologism and explicitly tried to “defend”
Aristotle from being interpreted from psychological perspective, their work re-
tained language referring to the human mind. In fact, their formulations of the
non-contradiction principle can even be used to formulate testable, empirical
hypotheses.
The key to the relevance of psychological law of non-contradiction for em-
pirical psychology are the verbs or verbal nouns it contains: “believe,” “con-
victions,” or “acknowledge.” The law does not state that humans are unable
to process contradictions whatsoever. We are obviously able to store contra-
dictory statements in our working memory and perform inferences separately
for p and ¬p5. After training, paraconsistent logicians may even apply some
of their principles and “slowly”6 infer conclusions from inconsistent premises.
However, what appears to be impossible is to fully believe two truly contra-
dictory statements. For the purpose of this work we will define ”belief” very
conservatively and reductively as: A statement is believed if it is used as a
premise for an inference performed in decision making7 Merely using a state-
ment for an inference cannot be considered belief, because people are able to
easily reason in terms of possible worlds (i.e., counterfactual reasoning) and
4 As translated by Vernon Wedin in 1971.
5 In logic such an act would be described in terms of reasoning about ”possible worlds,”
whereas in psychology such reasonings are called: ”counterfactual reasonings” (Roese 1997).
6 ”Slowly” in terms of the ”slow thinking,” described by Daniel Kahneman (2011) as
deliberative, highly conscious and logical form of thinking.
7 This definition is a practical version of the popular in philosophy way of defining ”belief”
as an attitude of regarding something as true (Schwitzgebel 2019 -Stanford).
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pretend to adopt beliefs that they do not truly endorse. Thus, a situation in
which an inference is performed has to be related to the content of the premise
that is a candidate for being a belief. In other words, beliefs are those propo-
sitions that influence human behaviour. For example, if a person is told that
the door in front of them will lead them outside and it will not lead them
outside (contradiction), a belief check would happen if they actually had to
go outside and make a decision if they should use the door. What do people
do when such circumstances occur? The answer to that question has already
been extensively studied by psychologists (see section 2).
Because of the principle of explosion, contradictions tend to be the end-
points for logical inferences in classical logic. Falsity of propositions is proven
by showing with a logically valid reasoning that they lead to a contradiction.
Since everything follows from a contradiction, therefore an inconsistent set of
premises is useless. However, contradictions are seemingly omnipresent in hu-
man thinking, language, culture and behaviour (Berliner et al. 2016, Spencer-
Rogers et al. 2009, Fletcher & Olwyler 1997). Some philosophers argued that
humans tolerate and perform inferences from contradictions and that classi-
cal logic does not represent the structure of human thinking. A need arose
to adopt systems that would formalize seemingly inconsistent human think-
ing and abandon the principle of explosion. For example, Luchins & Luchins
(1965, p. 62-63) wrote:
”Although traditional logic has proved to be a useful model of thinking, it may
not encompass all aspects of thinking. Just as, for certain purposes (e.g.
relativity theory), it is useful to apply non-Euclidean geometry even though
Euclidean geometry serves adequately as a model for earth measurement; so
it may be worthwhile to apply models of logic other than traditional logic to
human thinking.”
The need for such systems was answered between 1910 when  Lukasiewicz
published his work on the principle of non-contradiction by Aristotle, to 1976
when Miro Quesada proposed the name: ”paraconsistent logics” (Costa et al.
1995). Such logics reject the principle of non-contradiction and employ a weak-
ened version of the negation connective (Be´ziau 1999, p. 14)8 Of course, they
were not created solely in the XXth century, but instead are a product of a
long history of logical and philosophical works analysing the ex falso quodli-
bet principle and the properties of the negation and implication connectives.
Paraconsistent logics allow the existence of some inconsistent sets of premises
without “exploding.” However, it is important to note that they do not permit
every possible inconsistent set of premises, as that would make them trivial
(Novaes 2007). Contradictions are allowed, but only under certain conditions,
which every paraconsistent logic attempts to delineate.
8 Some logicians posit that paraconsistent logics are based on a misunderstanding or
fallacy, since they argue that negation which does not obey the law of non-cotradiction is
not really a negation (Quine 1970; Slater 1995). In our work we assume that paraconsistent
logics successfully achieve what they claim.
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For example, in the logic of Kolmogorov or minimal logic of Johansson
there are some affirmative propositions that do not follow from any contra-
diction, however any negation still always follows from any contradiction. In
Jas´kowski’s discussive logic, contradiction in the form: (p ∧ ¬p) does not “ex-
plode,” but a contradiction that takes the form of: ¬(p∨¬p) does, even though
in classical logic it is equivalent to: (p ∧ ¬p). A different approach was taken
by Nikolai Vasiliev who laid foundations for a logic 9 where the contradiction
(p ∧ ¬p) trivializes a system, unless the proposition p is a special ”Vasiliev
variable.” Evidently, different logicians employed different ways of rejecting
non-contradiction, which stems from the fact that they also differed in moti-
vations and goals for applying their systems.
Two main motivations guided the hand of the logicians who created para-
consistent logics. First, pure freedom of the mathematician or logician to de-
vise systems with arbitrary constraints, which may later find their way into
applied science. Second, the reflection that apparent contradictions are every-
where around us and that treating them as anomalies may not be the best
way to go.
With regard to the first motivation, the proponents of paraconsistency are
very explicit. Costa et al. (1995, p. 115-116) writes:
”(. . . ) we wish to point out that, from our viewpoint, when presenting a
formal system, one does not need to be concerned with the formulation of
philosophical rationales for the mathematical constraints introduced. (. . . )
Moreover, such systems are not thought of as capturing the true nature of the
world, nor of logic, of logicality or whatever. In the first instance, they were
just devised with the aim of putting forward a particular logical system
meeting certain theoretical constraints. Could such constraints be changed?
Of course, as in fact they have already been with the formulation of
alternative systems.”
As a result, it is imperative to remember that paraconsistent logics cannot
be criticised on the grounds of being inapplicable to some practical issues,
like human thinking for example. Paraconsistent logics were created with the
intention of being arbitrary logical systems which means that justification
of their applicability to any given problem is the task of philosophers and
scientists who study that problem. The aim of this work is therefore to argue
for a limited applicability of paraconsistent logics to human everyday thinking.
Jean-Yves Be´ziau (1999, p. 14) who is one of the most important researchers of
paraconsistency leaves its applicability to human thinking as an open question:
”Given a human being like John Smith, with contradictory desires and wills,
can we think that it is his normal state, that John Smith behaves in a
paraconsistent way and that paraconsistent logic is the adequate tool to
describe his behaviour? Or must we think that these contradictions are a kind
of disease that should be eliminated, for John Smith recovering his health,
following again the pattern of classical logic”
9 Formalized by Ayda Arruda in 1977.
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The fathers of paraconsistent logics are very stern in their stance that
their logics are not meant to replace classical logic (Costa et al. 2005). They
see paraconsistent logics merely as tools that should be used wherever they fit
better for their purpose than other types of logic.
However, some philosophers are much less conservative about the scope
that paraconsistent logic should cover and postulate it as the ‘go-to’ system
when analysing natural language production (McGinnis 2013). For example,
Megill (2004) argued that “we are in fact paraconsistent” in the context of
an ongoing debate regarding the nature of the human mind. Computational
Theory of Mind holds that human minds are Turing machines, but that view
came under scrutiny for many different reasons. One of them was our apparent
resilience to the Go¨del’s theorem. Megill (2004) posits that humans are able
to decide the truth of the Go¨del’s sentence because they are Turing machines
that do not employ classical logic as a principle of fuction, but instead use
paraconsistent logic (Megill argues mostly for relevance logic). In his arguments
he does not hesitate to refer to the reality of human thinking (Megill 2004, p.
27):
”The phenomenon of belief revision also suggests that we use paraconsistent
reasoning (. . . ). We believe something because we think it true, yet, humbly,
we do allow for the possibility that at least one of our beliefs could be—and
probably is—false; if we didn’t allow for this possibility, it’s hard to see how
belief revision would even be possible (. . . )”
The claim that belief revision in humans requires paraconsistent reasoning
is not true and we will discuss that in the next sections. However, such a claim
could also be dispelled by simply pointing out that classical computer programs
operating by the principles of classical logic have no problems updating their
memory with new information and deleting obsolete, old information, without
resorting to paraconsistency. Imagine a simple robot with a camera. Within its
memory it contains information that a hat is on the table. If upon an inspection
of the table it would find no hat there, it would update its information (belief?)
and now store information that there is no hat on the table. No one would
accuse the creator of the robot of using paraconsistent logic in their computer
code. That view on belief revision would be heavily criticised by one of the
fathers of praconsistent logics and dialetheism, Graham Priest. For example,
in 2008 he presented a comprehensive interpretation of belief revision through
the lens of paraconsistent logic (Priest, 2008).
The common belief that everyday human reasoning does not abide by the
rules of classical logic naturally generates theories addressing the question:
what type of logic does it abide by? Philosophers and scientists try to char-
acterize human thinking by finding the rules of inference that humans really
follow. Unfortunately, the surface appearances of everyday conclusions that
people make in their lives, led many researchers to believe that human rea-
soning is non-monotonic, paracomplete and paraconsistent. In fact, this idea
is strong enough, that when cognitive scientists try to devise a system that
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accurately captures human inferences, they use non-monotonicity and para-
consistency as main goals to be achieved by that system (Anderson et al.
2013).
In the next section we will analyse evidence against such a view of human
cognition. We will point out that the existence of contradictions in the hu-
man mind broadly understood does not mean that it performs paraconsistent
reasonings.
3 Psychological aspects
The most brutal and straightforward way of researching how human cognition
reacts to a contradiction is to present people with contradictory statements
and ask them for their understanding of them. That was done by Sharpe &
Lacroix in 1999. The experimenters examined 24 adults and 48 children (aged
3-8) and told them a story about two people having dinner. After the meal, one
person asked the other: ”Did you like your supper?”, to which the other person
replied: ”Yes and no. I liked my supper and I didn’t like it.” Participants of
the study were asked what did the second person mean with their response.
Every single participant of the study reinterpreted the reply in a way that
removes the apparent contradiction. Most of them (approximately 70%) got
rid of the contradiction by addressing the meaning of the word “supper” and
taking advantage of its generality. They assumed that the person giving the
reply meant that they liked one part of the supper but did not like another
part. However, some participants of the study used different strategies. Some
addressed the vagueness of the word ”like” and pointed out that perhaps
the supper was average, so the person neither liked it very much nor disliked
it very much. Others bluntly dismissed the whole reply and stated that the
person must have disliked the supper but was just trying to be polite. The
authors interpreted their results by stating that humans must be using some
”non-classical” forms of inference that helps them resolve contradictions. The
proponents of paraconsistency understand this as an argument for the exis-
tence of paraconsistent inferences in human thinking (Anderson et al. 2013).
However, people in the experiment were actively reinterpreting the meaning of
the reply in order to remove contradictions. Not to keep them simultaneously
in their belief structures and perform inferences on both. As a result, they
understood the reply in the experiment not as: (p ∧ ¬p) but as (p ∧ q). This
misunderstanding between psychological works and paraconsistent logicians
is even more apparent when considering research on the so-called cognitive
dissonance.
3.1 Cognitive dissonance
The issue of contradictory information in human thinking is most often tackled
by psychologists with the paradigm of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive disso-
nance is a phenomenon where a person becomes aware of an inconsistency
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between two or more beliefs that he or she holds. The concept was originally
coined by Leon Festinger in his book: ”A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance”
(1957). He argued that experiencing an apparent contradiction causes psycho-
logical stress and prompts people to remove it as soon as possible. A typical
example of a cognitive dissonance is the conundrum of the cigarette smoker.
How come that people who are aware of the adverse effects of smoking and
declare that they do not want to prematurely die, still smoke cigarettes? Let
us denote the smoker conundrum in the most generous way possible, so that it
will involve an actual contradiction of the form: It is the case that p and ¬p:
Premises :
p : Smoking cigarettes is not healthy
q : I do not want to do any things that are not healthy
r : I want to smoke cigarettes
Conclusions :
p ∧ q =⇒ ¬r
As we see, from the set of beliefs that a smoker holds, it might be possi-
ble to derive a conclusion that is contradictory to one of the premises (¬r).
However, it is important to highlight that the sentence r from the premises (I
want to smoke cigarettes) was not a part of the inference that led to ¬r. A
contradiction appears only when the set of original premises is compared to
the set of premises enriched by the new conclusions derived from it. The sen-
tence: r and ¬r, is not a starting point of any inferences, but an end to them.
Moreover, it gives rise to cognitive dissonance, which is a phenomenon aimed
at getting rid of that contradiction. In general, researchers have proposed that
humans deal with such contradictions in four ways (McGrath 2017):
– By changing one of their beliefs, values or behaviours. It is the most
straightforward approach, and for the smoking example this strategy could
mean completely abandoning one of the premises. Abandoning any of the
original premises: p, q or r, removes the contradiction.
– By justifying one their beliefs via challenging another. The justification
process involves adding new premises and modifying some of the old ones
(which actually means abandoning them and replacing them with others).
For example, if we add new ”justification” premises: t: I want to do fun
things and u: Some fun things are not healthy, we end up with a new
inference that leads to a new contradiction: t∧¬q (and ¬q contradicts the
original premise q). As a result, the person abandons q and replaces it with
q′: I want to do only some things that are not healthy. The ultimate result
is similar as in the first strategy (the challenged premise is abandoned),
but the process has extra steps and a new replacement premise is added.
– The third strategy as described by psychologists involves introducing new
beliefs that justify some of the old ones. In the smoking example it could
mean introducing a new belief w: Doing healthy things allows doing some
of the unhealthy things, which could translate into: ”I can keep smoking if
I balance it out by going to the gym twice a week.” From a purely formal
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perspective this strategy is akin to the previous one, since some premises
are added and some are removed (i.e., the premise q which addresses ”any”
unhealthy behaviours has to be replaced again with a weaker one).
– The fourth strategy of dealing with cognitive dissonance involves denial of
the existence of a contradiction, through discarding one of the premises.
For example, a smoker could say: ”Smoking is not really unhealthy, it is
just propaganda.” Again, from a purely formal perspective this strategy is
the same as the first one – one of the premises is abandoned (p: Smoking
cigarettes is not healthy), hence the contradiction never occurs.
It appears that the essence of dealing with contradictory information is dis-
counting one of the two opposing premises. Psychologists were also interested
in identifying which types of premises tend to be discounted most often. They
identified two most predominant types of beliefs that people hold. On the one
hand there are conditional beliefs, which express laws, hypotheses, theories or
rules that govern reality. For example: ”If I turn the key, my car’s engine will
start.” On the other hand there are categorical beliefs, which express observed
facts, for example: ”It is raining.” Numerous experiments have shown that
people have a tendency to reject conditional premises more often than cate-
gorical premises (Byrne & Walsh 2005). Most of the time, the rejection is not
complete and a modified, weakened premise takes the place of the original one,
just like in the aforementioned smoking example, where ”not wanting to do
any unhealthy things” is replaced with ”not wanting to do some unhealthy
things.” This is interesting, because it appears that humans are more readily
able to revise their convictions about the rules that govern the world rather
than revise the content of their own sensual observations of it.
The presented strategies of dealing with cognitive dissonance highlight two
crucial facts. First, that contradictions causing the dissonance are not premises
for any reasonings, but their conclusions. Second, that as soon as a conclu-
sion appears that is contradictory with our beliefs, we rush in to remove the
inconsistency, never allowing it to be a foundation for any reasoning. An argu-
ment against such a statement could be made by stating that inconsistencies
often already exist within a persons’ beliefs for a long time, while the cogni-
tive dissonance appears only after they are made consciously aware of them.
Therefore, one could say that before the contradiction was made visible, the
person was in fact reasoning from contradictory premises without being aware
of it. However, that argument assumes that all the beliefs, values and ideas
that we hold form one big set (i.e., a huge and messy set of premises), which
is not the case.
Human beliefs, ideas, values and any other concepts that could be reduced
down to statements of natural language do not form a singular set and can-
not be trivialized to one. One of the most prevalent paradigms in cognitive
science deals with the modularity of the human mind and partitions it into
several separate ”modules” which process different types of information and
produce different types of outputs (i.e., thoughts, emotions, behaviour, etc.)
(Calabretta & Parisi 2009). Human brains are comprised of separate areas
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that differ from each other anatomically and specialize in processing specific
kinds of signals (e.g., auditory, visual, tactile), making them functionally dis-
tinct, even though they communicate and cooperate constantly. Neuroimaging
studies already provided substantial amounts of data in support of that view
(Purves et al. 2008). From the biological partitioning of the brain stems a view
that the human mind (understood as the product of the brain function10) can
also be analysed as a set of modules. This view is especially useful for evolu-
tionary science, where the mind is compared to a ”Swiss Army knife,” where
every mental system has developed throughout evolution as a result of the
environmental demands. This overarching modularity in the brain also trans-
lates into more intricate, specific modularity that is immediately relevant for
the considerations on human reasoning. Namely, the existence of the so-called
cognitive schemata or cognitive scripts.
The term cognitive schema in psychology is very broad and denotes al-
most any memorized set of information (Derry 1996). In philosophy, cognitive
schemata are often understood as mental representations. Historically, the the-
ory of cognitive schemata can be traced to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant
(Marshall, 1995) and to Gestalt psychology. Because the definition of schema
is so broad, it captures many different types of information as different kids of
schemata, for example: beliefs, stereotypes, social roles, etc. The crucial point
is that to conserve energy and to maximize efficiency, not all schemata are ”ac-
tive” at the same time when humans think. Depending on the environment,
only the relevant schemata are going to be ”active” and used in inferences (or
in regulating behaviour and emotions). For example, students in the math-
ematics class will have their schemata containing mathematical laws active,
making their work on the exercises faster and more accurate. At the same
time, if the same students were to be asked about some formula during a so-
cial gathering, it would take them a few moments to retrieve the schema and
remember the answer. From an evolutionary perspective it would be a waste of
valuable resources to use all available information in all circumstances, instead
of using only the information judged as relevant.
For the purposes of analysing the logic of human thinking, cognitive schemata
can be understood as sets of premises from which conclusions (i.e., behaviour)
can be derived11. As a result, different schema may contain different premises,
which could sometimes contradict each other if brought together. The contra-
dictions would remain unknown, for as long as two inconsistent schemata are
not used together for the purposes of some reasoning. However, if that hap-
pens, cognitive dissonance occurs and the contradiction has to be removed.
That means that people do live with contradictions, but do not reason from
them. Contradictions are spread across separate schemata/mental representa-
tions/memories/cognitive scripts and do not form a uniform, inconsistent set
10 A common view of neuroscientists and psychologists on the nature of the mind is summed
up in the quote by Swaab (2014, page 5): ”The product of the interaction of all these billions
of neurons is called ’mind’. Just as kidneys produce urine, the brain produces mind (...)”
11 Of course, linguistic premises alone would not be sufficient to explain human behaviour
as they would not properly represent e.g. emotions.
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of premises. Furthermore, even human reasoning abilities are partitioned, so
that different types of inferences are performed by different mental modules
localized in different parts of the brain (Osherson et al. 1998, Wertheim &
Ragni 2020). In fact, even the process of resolving contradictions itself has
been isolated and pin-pointed to specific brain regions (Medaglia et al. 2009,
Porcaro et al. 2014). This concept of partitioning of the self is not foreign to
philosophy. Ruwen Ogien, French philosopher wrote: ”There is no hardcore
personality, stable, unified, invariant from one situation to another” (Ogien
2011, p. 40, translation by: Berliner et al. 2016)
However, a question may be asked: why do people refuse to reason from
inconsistent premises? It is false to say that such reasonings are completely
impossible, because paraconsistent logics clearly show that it is possible to
devise a system that tolerates some inconsistencies. As before, the answer
lies in the evolution and the efficiency of our cognition. In his works, Leon
Festinger did not explain why do people experience cognitive dissonance or
what is the purpose of its existence (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones 2007).
The simplest answer is that cognitive dissonance causes mental stress, negative
affect or discomfort and people seek to remove these feelings (Newby-Clark et
al. 2002). However, that does not explain anything, since we can continue to
ask: why does a contradiction cause stress?
A compelling answer that ties to logic and information theory was recently
given by Kaaronen (2018). The author relates cognitive dissonance to the fact
that the human mind is constantly engaged in a phenomenon called ”predic-
tive coding.” Predictive processing is a theory stating that the human brain
continuously attempts to anticipate the incoming stimuli (i.e., information).
To put it simply, a stimuli successfully predicted before it arrived, is a stim-
uli expected, probably safe and most probably well-understood. Conversely,
something unexpected is potentially dangerous and because a schema for an
unexpected stimulus could not have been activated in advance, it takes more
effort (i.e., resources) to comprehend. As a result, the theory of predictive
processing postulates that humans aim to reduce ”prediction error,” which
means instances in which the anticipations of the brain failed to successfully
meet the incoming information. Kaaronen (2018) points out that contradic-
tory information is useless in minimizing the prediction error. It is even worse
that no information at all, since contradictory information takes up resources
to be encoded, while providing no advantage in predictive processing at all.
As a result, humans aim to remove contradictions, to avoid prediction errors
and unnecessary use of resources, which could both translate into maladaptive
behaviours.
Overall, the aspects of the cognitive dissonance most important for logic
are:
– Contradictions that cause cognitive dissonance are not premises for infer-
ences, but their conclusions.
The psychological aspects of paraconsistency 13
– Contradictory information is held by people, but in separate sets of premises
(i.e. cognitive schemata) and cognitive dissonance occurs when different
sets of premises are merged into a new, inconsistent one.
– The very nature of cognitive dissonance is to remove these contradictions
as soon as they are detected.
– Holding contradictory information in separate cognitive schemata may be
useful (different circumstances require different approaches), but a con-
tradiction held in the currently active set of premises impedes predictive
coding.
3.2 Dialectical thinking
The other way in which psychology addresses the existence of contradictions in
human thinking is the so-called ”dialectical thinking.” Dialectical thinking may
be considered an opposite of the cognitive dissonance. Peng & Nisbett (1999,
p. 4) defined it as: ”cognitive tendency toward acceptance of contradiction.”
The proponents of that concept ascribe it in particular to the Chinese culture
and philosophy. They explain, that Western culture was built on the founda-
tion of Aristotelian logic, especially the laws of non-contradiction and the law
of excluded middle, often separating the form from the content (i.e., syntactic
from semantic). In contrast, East Asian philosophy focused on the ideas of
change, holism and the integration of the form and the content. As a result,
dialectical thinking is supposed to be more prevalent among the members of
the Eastern cultures who are seemingly more tolerant towards contradictions.
Dialectical thinking is therefore considered to be a personality trait and empir-
ical psychological studies pursue answers to how ”tolerance of contradictions”
affects our reasoning and behaviour (DeMotta et al., 2016).
However, a closer inspection of the concept of dialectical thinking reveals a
fatal flaw in its definition and conceptualization. To uncover that flaw, let us
consider the extensive theoretical explanation of dialectical thinking provided
by Peng & Nisbett (1999)12. The authors explicitly contrast dialectical think-
ing with the thinking that satisfies the law of non-contradiction and the law
of excluded middle. They write:
”It is obvious now to readers that these laws of formal logic are not
congruent with the principles of Eastern na¨ıve dialecticism. (. . . ) Hence, for
a dialectical thinker, both A and B may be right, or both A and B13 may
equal a third element C that may not be part of the initial contradiction.”
Thus, we would expect that dialectical thinking defined in this way would
be close to paraconsistent logics, where a truly inconsistent set of premises may
12 I picked that work since its authors are arguably the most notable researchers of dialecti-
cal thinking and their works on the matter have been extensively cited. For more literature
on the issue see also: Nisbett et al. (2001), Spencer-Rogers et al. (2009), DeMotta et al.
(2016), Wong (2006).
13 By B the authors most probably mean ¬A.
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yield meaningful conclusions, instead of exploding. However, a closer look at
the principles of dialectical thinking and the examples given by the authors
paints a whole different picture. Peng & Nisbett (1999) define the original
principles that are supposed to be in contrast with the Aristotelian tradition
and gave rise to dialectical thinking as follows:
– Principle of change (Bian Yi Lu) states that everything is a process, ev-
erything is subject to constant dynamic changes and everything flows from
non-existence into existence and vice-versa.
– Principle of contradiction (Mao Dun Lu) states that reality is filled with
contradictions (e.g. good and evil, old and new). An example of that princi-
ple in the old Daosim is given by Lao-zi (570?-490?BC/1993, p.16): ”When
the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises the recog-
nition of ugliness; When they all know the good as good, there arises the
recognition of evil. And so, being and nonbeing produce each other.”
– Principle of holism (Zheng He Lu) states that everything is connected and
that to understand a concept fully it has to be understood in the complete
context of its existence and its relations to other concepts. Everything
analysed in separation from the rest will be distorted and the whole is
more than just a sum of its parts.
These three principles are meant to constitute foundation for a mode of
thinking, where contradictions are tolerated or even welcome. However, so far,
nothing in these principles explicitly violates the laws of non-contradiction
and the law of excluded middle. In the first principle, constant changes are
thought to be a source of contradiction because they were summed up with
a metaphor: ”life is a constant passing from one stage of being to another,
so that to be is not to be, and not to be is to be”(Peng & Nisbett, 1999, p.
7). However, highlighting the fact that reality is a process and is dynamically
changing does not have to imply any contradictions of the conservative form:
It is the case that p and ¬p. A metaphor that states ”to be is not to be, and
not to be is to be” is useful to understand the general message and spirit of the
principle, but does not express the actual content of the Bian Yi Lu principle
that was otherwise stated. One could not use that metaphor alone and infer
the content of the principle from it without extensive additional information.
Interpreting metaphors that contain contradictions cannot be equated with
accepting contradictions in reasoning, because the process of interpreting is
one of ascribing a meaning to a statement – a meaning that ultimately will not
contain a contradiction – just like in the aforementioned principle. However,
the proponents of dialetheism would strongly disagree with that interpretation
and argue that the eastern philosophy should be often taken literally and not
as metaphors (Deguchi et al. 2008).
For the other two principles, the postulated incompatibility with the law
of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle is even less apparent.
The principle of contradiction merely states that opposites exist in the world
at the same time. It is not contradictory to say that beautiful things exist
at the same time as ugly things exist. It would not even be contradictory to
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say that something could be beautiful and ugly at the same time, because the
existence of two independent, subjective judges of beauty is implied. Nothing
in the second principle, nor in the third postulates that sometimes it is the
case that p and ¬p.
It appears that proponents of human dialectical thinking do not define it
as thinking from contradictory premises in the strict sense of the term. Indeed,
in their first example, Peng & Nisbett (1999, p. 1) present two statements that
are supposed to contradict each other:
”A: Two mathematicians have discovered that the activities of a butterfly in
Beijing, China, noticeably affect the temperature in the San Francisco Bay
Area.
B: Two meteorologists have found that the activities of a local butterfly in the
San Francisco Bay Area have nothing to do with temperature changes in the
same San Francisco Bay Area.”
The authors go as far as to write that saying that these two statements
do not contain a contradiction is ”pretending” and a strategy of ”denial”.
However, even though these two statements are unlikely to be both true, they
are definitely not contradictory in the strict sense. Therefore, it appears that
dialectical thinking is a phenomenon of tolerance for ”weak” contradictions or
quasi-contradictions – statements that are unlikely to be both true at the same
time, metaphors that use contradictions, opposite but co-existing concepts
(e.g. ugliness and beauty). This fact was already pointed out by Chan (2000)
in his article, the title of which says it all: ”Formal logic and dialectical thinking
are not incongruent.” I move one step further than that and highlight, that
true contradictions are extremely rare in human thinking and that postulating
that humans tolerate inconsistency in their reasoning is suspicious at best.
4 Discussion
Human history and literature is overflowing with instances of apparent con-
tradictions. In the beginning of twentieth century, anthropologists debated if
the law of non-contradiction is a universal rule across cultures. Lucien Le´vy-
Bruhl (1910) postulated that it is culture-specific. He cited Indians from South
America who had no problem with saying, for example: ”We are red parrots”
or ”Sorcerers are bush cats.” He later changed his mind and returned to con-
sidering the law of con-contradiction as universal. However, the idea that many
cultural works are examples of contradictions survived. Hegelian and Marx-
ist dialectics are often cited as a primary example of them, even though upon
closer inspection, there is no inconsistency to be found anywhere in those theo-
ries. They propose that thesis and anti-thesis are opposing forces that interact
to produce a synthesis. But thesis and anti-thesis are separate phenomena.
Nothing in dialectics is supposed to be simultaneously true and false, instead
it is merely the opposition between mutually exclusive ideas. In Table 1, I
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Table 1 Examples of quasi-contradictions used in the literature to show that humans tol-
erate contradictory premises.
Type of the quasi-contradiction Examples
Statements that are unlikely to both be
true or conditional statements with
missing context
– Everything we eat causes and prevents
cancer at the same time
– Some researchers verified theory X and
some researchers falsified theory X
Metaphors and oxymorons
– ”to be is not to be, and not to be is to
be”
– ”I must be cruel only to be kind”
Co-existence of opposite ideas
– Freudian ”splitting of the ego”
(co-existence of fear and desire for
castration)
– Carl Jung’s idea of ”self” as coin-
cidentia oppositorum (anima and
animus, persona and shadow)
– Hegelian dialectics (co-existence of
thesis and antithesis)
– Chinese dualism (yin yang)
Behaviours incongruent with some
personality trait – Being both superstitious and Christian
– Smoking and caring about own health
summarize some typical examples of using the word “contradiction” in a com-
mon sense to describe things that are not contradictions in the logical sense
of the word.
David Berliner (2016, p. 2) in his anthropological study of contradictions
in the human culture wrote:
”Yes, humans are full of contradictions. So, how to live with principles,
emotions, and behaviours that contradict each other? How can one have a
thought, and in the same movement, its opposite?”
This critical question contains the clue to solving the problem of contra-
dictions in human reasoning. It is the fragment that reads: ”in the same move-
ment.” The research on human reasoning under the conditions of inconsistency
taught us that humans as a whole can indeed entertain contradictory premises
throughout their lives. At one time we can choose to believe p, but on another
time when the context is different, we can believe ¬p. However, no study so far
The psychological aspects of paraconsistency 17
showed any indication that humans can simultaneously accept p and ¬p and
derive non-trivial conclusions from both at the same time. The emphasis on
the timeframe is critical for unravelling how humans process inconsistencies.
The Aristotelian psychological principle of non-contradiction translated by
 Lukasiewicz states that contradictions ”cannot obtain in the same conscious-
ness.” Unfortunately, empirical research clearly shows that this formulation of
the principle cannot hold. Clearly, spread across different points in time con-
tradictory beliefs can exist within the consciousness of a person.  Lukasiewicz
formulated his interpretation of the law of non-contradiction long before psy-
chology became an established field of science and gave any insights about hu-
man consciousness. As a result, his formulation of the principle was the best
for its time. However, according to our current (albeit very limited) under-
standing of the human mind, consciousness is a process, not a physical object.
Speaking of the existence of contradictions within a consciousness calls for
specifying a timeframe. Same goes for our memory, self, beliefs or schemata.
Does it qualify our reasonings as paraconsistent if on Monday we believe p
and on Sunday we begin to believe ¬p? It appears that the relevant timeframe
should be defined by behaviour. I defined beliefs as the information that is
being used in decision making. As a result, beliefs are the information that
was processed by the brain and resulted in a given decision/behaviour. This
is a physicalist, reductionist and in-fact very deterministic definition of be-
liefs. However, that definition is good bridge between the empirical domain of
psychology and the formal domain of logic.
Interestingly, the un-adapted, original formulation of the non-contradiction
principle by Aristotle better suits that reductionist view of beliefs: ”No one
can believe that the same thing is and is not.” If believing is defined as the in-
formation that leads to a singular behaviour, then the law of non-contradiction
is not violated. The studies on cognitive dissonance and predictive coding de-
scribed in this article demonstrated that humans persistently refuse to accept
two contradictory premises in a given situation and always reject or modify
one of them.
Of course, our current understanding of human beliefs is largely depen-
dent on introspection (i.e., self-report). Not only do we as researchers have no
access to the internal world of a research subject, every human has limited
access even to their own mental processes. Every reply to a question in an
experiment goes through the filter of consciousness and is subjected to the
limitations of language. However, thanks to the recent scientific advancements
in measuring brain activity with neuroimaging it might be possible to analyse
human beliefs without having to resort to explicitly asking research partici-
pants for their opinions. Instead, we can refer to the unconscious mechanisms
of information processing and create correlates (i.e., biomarkers) that can be
viewed as epiphenomena to mental processes (i.e., qualia). For example, with
the use of such methods it was recently demonstrated that the Liar paradox
is processed by the human brain like a false statement (Rudnicki &  Lukowski,
2019). Future studies could empirically address the question if it is indeed
truly impossible to believe contradictory statements. Of course, such studies
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would still not give us full access to the mental processes of another person,
but at least they rid us of the additional problems with introspection and
communicating thoughts with language.
To the best of my knowledge, any existing empirical research in cognitive
science, that deals with processing of contradictory information, implicitly as-
sumes that the law of non-contradiction has to be satisfied and that humans
”update their beliefs” by using new information to determine which of the two
is more likely to be true: p or ¬p (Kalra et al. 2011). In fact, the process
of belief updating is critical for learning since the presence of contradictions
prompts humans to explore the environment and search for a solution of the
contradiction (i.e. obtain information that would allow to abandon one of the
contradictory premises). More than that, by causing confusion, contradictions
can even facilitate the learning process (Lehman et al. 2011). A beautiful
example of seemingly co-existing contradictory beliefs, which are not really
contradictory upon closer inspection, was given by Wood et al. (2012). The
authors examined peoples’ degrees of belief in different mutually-exclusive con-
spiracy theories. Participants in their study had to rate on a 7-point scale how
much do they agree with several statements. The most notable examples were
(Wood et al. 2012, p. 769-770):
1. One or more rogue ”cells” in the British secret service constructed and
carried out a plot to kill Diana
2. Diana faked her own death so that she and Dodi could retreat into isolation.
3. Osama bin Laden is still alive.
4. When the raid took place, Osama bin Laden was already dead.
The results showed that belief in any conspiracy theory was positively
correlated with beliefs in other theories, even if they were contradictory. In
other words, if a person indicated that they believe that the British Intelligence
assassinated Diana, then statistically speaking, they were also more likely to
to indicate that they believe that Diana is still alive and faked her own death.
Identical relationship was found for statements regarding Osama bin Laden. At
a first glance, this is clearly a situation when some people just simultaneously
believe in completely opposite premises. An argument against it could be made
by pointing out the probabilistic nature of answers given by participants (1-7
scale). However, an even better argument was inadvertently by the authors
of the study themselves. To analyse what makes people believe in statements
about Osama bin Laden, they also asked the participants if they agree with
the statement (Wood et al. 2012, p. 770):
5. The actions of the Obama administration indicate that they are hiding some
important or damaging piece of information about the raid
Not surprisingly, the degree of agreement with that statement was posi-
tively related to degrees of agreement with statements 3 and 4. In other words,
people who indicated that they believe that the government is hiding some-
thing were also more likely to indicate that they believe both that Osama bin
Laden is alive and that he was already long dead before the raid. However,
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most importantly, statistical analysis showed that the positive correlation be-
tween statements 3 and 4 completely disappears when statement 5 is entered
into the equation. In simple words, people who indicated belief in contradic-
tory theories, did so not because they specifically believed them both at the
same time. They did so because they believed that the government was in-
volved in some kind of a cover up, but they just did not know which one. The
authors summarize it as follows (Wood et al. 2012, p. 771):
”This indicates that the correlation in endorsement of the two contradictory
theories is explainable entirely by their connection with belief in a deceptive
cover-up by authority (. . . ) For those who hold such beliefs, the specifics of a
conspiracy theory do not matter as much as the fact that it is a conspiracy
theory at all.”
Psychological literature does not argue with the fact that people could
have contradictory beliefs. However, it points out that these beliefs are stored
separately in different sets of beliefs and whenever we need to merge these
sets for some reasoning, a cognitive dissonance appears to get rid of the con-
tradiction. This view is supported by the research on the modularity of the
human mind, but not only that. Anthropologists have been aware of that phe-
nomenon long before cognitive psychologists began their work on it. In 1955,
when behaviourism reigned supreme in psychology and rejected any notions
that pertained to the mind, anthropologist Roger Bastide proposed some-
thing called: ”the compartmentalization principle” to explain the co-existence
of contradictory behaviours in Afro-Brazilian rituals (Bastide 1955). He ar-
gues that human actions have to be always considered in context. In different
circumstances, different beliefs take precedence. For example, people who par-
ticipate in the occult, while at the same time being members of the rational
world, ”distinguish between domains of truth that ’belong to different dimen-
sions’” (Berliner et al. 2016, p. 3). The compartmentalization principle can
be expressed in even simpler terms. Anthropologist Richard Schweder gives an
example stating: ”The entire top of the table appears to be green and the en-
tire top of the table appears to be grey” (Berliner et al. 2016, p. 10). He points
out that nobody would consider this a violation of the non-contradiction prin-
ciple, because visual and tactile perception are separate compartments. The
same goes for other cognitive structures of the human mind, like schemata,
memories, etc. Modern cognitive psychology supports this view and no longer
considers the human self to be a unified entity.
Interestingly, modularity of the mind and the compartmentalization princi-
ple are known to some paraconsistent logicians. McGinnis (2013, p. 639) in his
work devoted to explaining how paraconsistent logic can be applied to explain
the existence of inconsistencies in natural language wrote:
”Any serious scientific theory of natural language must take into account the
fact that modularity of mind will lead to ineliminable informational
inconsistencies. What is far less obvious, and a harder problem for future
research, is what exact form this inconsistency-tolerance takes.”
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However, he takes it as an argument for the paraconsistency of human everyday
thinking, not against it, McGinnis (2013, p. 631):
”It is a simple fact of psychology that our internal mental states can conflict
in fundamental ways, with each other and with themselves. Any theory of
mind that is committed to the existence of real mental events is ipso facto
committed to inconsistency, as is any theory of language that concerns itself
with internal (mental) events as well.”
Here we argue that modularity of the mind does not lead to inconsistencies
but instead is actually a form of inconsistency removal.
In conclusion, humans the masters of contradicting themselves. We hold
contradictory beliefs and create countless ideas that seem inconsistent. Try-
ing to model our thinking with classical logic has proven to be difficult, if
not impossible. However, despite that, whenever we perform an inference that
leads to any particular behaviour, we do not tolerate contradictions. We de-
fend ourselves from them with the various mechanisms of cognitive dissonance
and compartmentalization. Where paraconsistent logics start their inferences,
humans end theirs.
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